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We analyse and compare individual beliefs about the effects of competition and their 
evolution over time in transition economies and experienced market economies. At the onset 
of transition, competition beliefs in transition countries are far more positive than in market 
economies. Over time, this difference has vanishes. Convergence can be attributed to 
changing believes in transition countries. We argue that overly optimistic competition beliefs 
in transition countries contributed to the possibility of implementing far reaching pro-market 
reforms and show that competition beliefs underlay support for economic reform. The 
empirical analysis is supplemented with a simple learning model rationalizing the findings on 
competition belief overshooting.  
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Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, a number of countries engaged in a 
process of systemic change, replacing formerly centrally planned economies with market 
economies. Market reforms were in general supported by democratic decision-making. 
Involving citizens in the political process resulted in additional political constraints in the 
formulation of reform policies: beliefs of the electorate about how well markets work, found 
their expression in the ballots.  
In the present paper individual beliefs on the effect of market competition and their 
evolution over time in transition economies and experienced market economies are analysed 
and compared. We argue that overly positive beliefs about the performance of markets 
prevailed at the time when transition began, allowing the implementation of far reaching 
reform policies. Hence, they played an important role at a crucial juncture in the history of 
those countries, contributing to extend the role of markets and reduce the role of the 
government in the coordination of economic activity.  
There is a growing body of economic literature which seeks to understand the 
interaction between reform policies, policy outcomes and the reform path. Using a political 
economy approach, a number of theoretical contributions establish that adverse reform 
outcomes might lead to policy reversals or abolition of ongoing reforms.1 In fact, public 
support for market reforms was widespread in most post-communist countries when strong 
reform policies were introduced. While policy measures and resulting outcomes varied greatly 
(Svenjar 2002, Milanovic 1999), all transition countries experienced a reduction in output, 
rising inequality, inflation, and unemployment (World Bank 2002, EBRD 1999). Economists 
and most politicians have been aware that adaptation processes are likely to lead to a 
temporary economic downturn, resulting in a J-shaped evolution of output and employment 
over the course of transition. Still, a lot of relevant actors where taken by surprise when public 
support rapidly diminished, reforms stalled, and in some countries parties opposing market 
reforms were soon voted into power (Wyplosz 1993, Fidrmuc 2000). 
Empirical contributions analysing survey and election data complement theoretical 
approaches to understand the determinants of public support for market reforms. Using data 
from the Russian elections in 1995, Warner (2001) exploits regional variation in reform effort 
and finds that more intense reforms result in higher public support. Using election and survey 
data from 1991 to 1997 Jackson et al. (2003) show that a growth of new enterprises resulted 
in a pro-reform constituency which changed the political arena. For Bulgaria, Valev (2004) 
                                                 
1 See for example Rodrik (1995), Dewatripont and Roland (1992, 1995) and Wyplosz (1993). Roland (2000, 
2002) provides an extensive survey of the literature.  
 3
presents the rather surprising finding that personal unemployment results in stronger support 
for reform. He uses survey data and argues that the majority of the population is aware of the 
necessary short term cost of reforms, expecting future benefits. Doyle and Fidrmuc (2003) use 
opinion surveys from the Czech Republic from 1991 to 1998 to document political preference 
change of the constituency over time. While reforms had broad support at the onset of 
transition and political preferences mostly varied over age and education, economic outcomes 
got more decisive in later years. Private economy jobs and high incomes increased, the 
experience of widespread unemployment in the social environment decreased reform support. 
Another survey based analysis for Russia is presented by Eble and Koeva (2002). They find 
that education has a positive, age a negative effect on the support for reform. In addition, 
ideology, private sector participation and regional characteristics play a role in shaping reform 
preferences. Focusing on political constraints in the reform process, Doyle and Walsh (2007) 
find that voting in 1990, in the Czech Republic, was forward-looking and voters’ expectations 
largely correct. 
Next to theses single country studies, some authors have studied groups of transition 
countries. Fidrmuc (2000) analyses election outcomes for the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Poland, and Slovakia, exploiting regional variation in population composition. He finds that 
private entrepreneurs, white collar workers and university educated voters are pro-reform, 
while the unemployed, retirees, blue collar and agricultural workers oppose reform. Hayo 
(2004) uses two data sets to separately perform a macro- and microeconomic analysis. On the 
macro level unemployment, inflation, privatization and enterprise restructuring are found to 
reduce public support for market reforms while democratization, foreign aid per capita and 
the creation of working financial markets increase support. On the micro level, labour market 
status, education, age, gender, the economic status of a person and ideology affect support for 
the creation of a market economy. Specifically, higher education and younger age are found 
to increase reform support; individual unemployment decreases the acceptance of reforms. 
Kim and Pirttilä (2006) use the Central and Eastern Eurobarometer Survey, also used by Hayo 
(2004), to examine the linkages between political constraints and economic reform. They 
show that support for reforms depend on past macroeconomic conditions and the perception 
of individual consequences of future reforms.  
The present study uses a difference-in-difference estimation approach, to add to the 
understanding of public support for reform. However, instead of directly analysing survey 
questions on reform or election results, competition beliefs are analysed. It is argued that 
beliefs about the desirability or non-desirability of competition are fundamental to individual 
attitudes towards a market economy and accordingly shape attitudes toward systemic reform. 
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We find that at the onset of transition, beliefs in competition were far more optimistic in 
transition countries than in established market economies, contributing to the acceptance of 
wide ranging economic reforms. Overly optimistic competition beliefs, which are later 
revised, seem to contrast Doyle’s and Walsh’s (2007) finding that individuals behave forward 
looking and hold correct anticipations. This perspective of biased beliefs will be challenged in 
the second part of the paper, where a simple signalling model is employed to show that 
potentially biased media might induce perfectly rational agents to overestimate the merits of 
markets.  
The present paper also connects to the literature on the socialist legacy, i.e. how do 
institutional differences under a socialist system affect individuals’ preferences and beliefs 
(Murthi and Tiongson 2008 and references therein, Corneo and Grüner 2002, Alesina and 
Fuchs-Schündeln 2007). The paper is also closely related to the investigation of capitalism 
aversion as contributed by Landier, Thesmar and  Thoenig (2008).  
In the following section potential determinants of competition beliefs are evaluated. In 
Section 3 the data and sample used in the empirical analysis will be introduced.  Descriptive 
and estimated results on the overshooting and convergence hypothesis are presented in 
Section 4. The linkage between competition beliefs and support for economic reforms will be 
considered in Section 5. In Section 6 possible explanations for the overshooting phenomenon 
will be considered. A simple signalling model will help to rationalize the empirical findings. 
Section 7 finally concludes.   
 
Determinants of Faith in the Market 
 
To investigate the dynamics of competition beliefs, we control for individual- and 
macro-level characteristics, which will be presented in detail in the next section. Respective 
variables are primarily included to control for potential conflating effects. However, for some 
of those variables, theoretical considerations justify their inclusion. Why and how would they 
affect competition beliefs? 
Age determines an individual’s position in the lifecycle. Success in competition 
demands physical and mental strength. At some point, aging reduces strength and thus the 
probability of successful competition. Accordingly, we can expect that a positive belief in 
competition declines with age. In addition, older individuals might possess human capital that 
is outdated and devalued in a competitive market environment (e.g. Chase 1998, Campos and 
Dabusinskas 2002, Guriev and Zhuravskaya 2009). 
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Different outcomes in the labour market for women and men are partly the result of a 
lower competitiveness of women (Gneezy et al. 2003, Datta Gupta et al. 2005a). We 
hypothesize that less competitive behaviour of women comes with a less positive attitude 
toward competition. However, Gneezy et al. (2008) show that there is a strong cultural 
component in gender differences with regard to competitiveness, so that the influence of 
gender on competition in principle might be ambiguous across countries. 
With different sets of dummy variables we will control for marriage status, job status, 
job type and town size. Regarding marriage status, there is no conjecture as to the effect of 
being divorced or widowed. Married men earn a wage premium, which in the literature is 
explained either by marriage induced productivity increases or the presence of characteristics 
which are simultaneously desired in the labour and marriage market (Chun and Lee 2001, 
Datta Gupta et al. 2005a and 2005b, Nakosteen and Zimmer 1997). In any case, marriage 
raises the probability of successful competition so that married individuals should have more 
positive beliefs toward competition.  
An individual’s living environment presumably also influences beliefs. Dummy 
variables for town size are used to proxy for living environment. Population density rises with 
town size. Higher population density implies stronger competition due to more competitors. 
Thus bigger cities have stronger competition and their inhabitants should, in equilibrium, have 
more positive attitudes toward competition.  
The variables on job status, job type and income might have a reciprocal relation with 
competition beliefs. Accordingly, specifications including those variables could result in 
biased estimates due to endogeneity. These variables will be included to assure robustness. 
The central argument that a possible endogeneity bias is not important in our context derives 
from the fact that the central result remains qualitatively robust across specifications. 
To control for economy-wide factors, macro variables are taken into account. The 
market is the arena where competition is enacted. Macro variables indicate the performance of 
the economy and thus of the market and might influence individual judgments about the 
desirability of markets and competition. An additional argument for the inclusion of 
macroeconomic variables comes from the literature on economic voting. There it is argued 
that individual voting decisions are influence stronger by national economic conditions, than 
by individual economic circumstances (Valev 2004). Finally, we follow Hayo (2004) who 
presents compelling arguments for the inclusion of inflation, unemployment and GDP growth 
in the explanation of support for market reforms. We hypothesize that high inflation, high 
unemployment, low per-capita income, shrinking GDP (negative GDP growth) and high 
income inequality reduce support for competition.  
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Data and Sample 
 
The analysis is based on data from the World Values Survey and the European Values 
Survey (WVS, 2006), a multinational survey conducted in four waves since 1980 in a host of 
countries.2 The central item we focus on is a question on individual beliefs about the effects of 
competition: 
 
“Now I'd like you to tell me your views on various issues. How would you place your 
views on this scale? 10 means you agree completely with the statement on the left; 1 
means you agree completely with the statement on the right; and if your views fall 
somewhere in between, you can choose any number in between.  
Sentences: 
Competition is good. It stimulates people to work hard and develop new ideas vs. 
Competition is harmful. It brings the worst in people.” 
 
The emphasis on hard work and the development of new ideas clearly indicates that the 
question refers to the incentives that people expect from a system of market competition. The 
dependent variable competition is coded so that it takes higher values for more positive beliefs 
about competition (from '1 Competition is harmful' to '10 Competition is good'). Likert-scaled 
variables on self-reported beliefs and attitudes often exhibit a lot of noise. To minimize the 
influence of noise, a binary dependent variable, competition_bin10, with a cut-off at 1 is 
coded. Robustness checks with dependent variables with cut-off points 9, 8, and 7 
(competition_bin9 - competition_bin7) and the original ordinal variable are performed. The 
distribution of this variable is shown in Table 1. Competition beliefs have not been surveyed 
in the first wave of the WVS. Accordingly, only waves 2, 3 and 4 are used. The surveys of the 
second wave have been conducted in the years 1989-1993. In fact, most transition countries 
are surveyed in 1990, at the onset of transition.3 
Table 1: Distribution of the original dependent variables 
competition Freq. Percent Cum. 
competition harmful     1 4,430 3.69 3.69 
2 2,201 1.83 5.53 
3 4,545 3.79 9.31 
4 4,759 3.97 13.28 
5 6,585 5.49 18.77 
6 18,235 15.2 33.96 
7 14,185 11.82 45.78 
8 19,211 16.01 61.79 
9 15,704 13.09 74.88 
competition good        10 30,147 25.12 100 
Total 120,002 100  
 
 
                                                 
2 Detailed documentation of the data can be obtained from http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/ 
3 The actual survey year in each wave and country is shown in Table A1 in Appendix A. 
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The sample for analysis is made up of OECD- and transition countries. Respective 
countries, their status and mean levels of competition beliefs (competition_bin10) by wave are 
shown in Table 2. On inspection of Table 2 it becomes obvious that there are a considerable 
number of countries without observations on competition beliefs at the onset of the transition 
process, i.e. in wave 2. These countries are dropped from the analysis, since it is precisely the 
beginning of transition we focus on.4  We are left with a sample of 120,002 individual 
observations in 35 countries.5 Romania has the highest value with 44% of respondents 
indicating that competition is a good thing. In the Netherlands, the countries with lowest 
competition beliefs, only 6% of the population hold such positive beliefs. 
 
Table 2: Country means of competition_bin10 by wave and country 
Country Status 1989-1993 1994-1999 1999-2004 Total 
Albania transition . 0.175 0.313 0.244 
Armenia transition . 0.210 . 0.210 
Australia OECD . 0.271 . 0.271 
Austria OECD 0.251 . 0.231 0.241 
Azerbaija transition . 0.343 . 0.343 
Belarus transition 0.313 0.269 0.249 0.276 
Belgium OECD 0.185 . 0.127 0.161 
Bosnia transition . 0.341 0.362 0.351 
Bulgaria transition 0.392 0.233 0.324 0.316 
Canada OECD 0.339 . 0.229 0.281 
Chile OECD 0.333 0.190 0.194 0.249 
Croatia transition . 0.355 0.441 0.394 
Czech Republic transition/OECD 0.537 0.211 0.267 0.392 
Denmark OECD 0.167 . 0.138 0.152 
Estonia transition/OECD 0.398 0.260 0.147 0.269 
Finland OECD 0.163 0.137 0.105 0.130 
France OECD 0.168 . 0.162 0.164 
Georgia transition . 0.381 . 0.381 
Germany-West OECD 0.226 0.138 0.170 0.190 
Germany-East transition/OECD 0.343 0.147 0.172 0.233 
Greece OECD . . 0.152 0.152 
Hungary transition/OECD 0.296 0.319 0.294 0.301 
Iceland OECD 0.297 . 0.340 0.322 
Ireland OECD 0.210 . 0.202 0.206 
Italy OECD 0.185 . 0.187 0.186 
Japan OECD 0.097 0.092 0.115 0.103 
South-Korea OECD 0.364 0.163 0.151 0.227 
Kyrgyz Rep transition . . 0.383 0.383 
Latvia transition 0.552 0.240 0.264 0.335 
Lithuania transition 0.372 0.264 0.274 0.303 
Luxembourg OECD . . 0.156 0.156 
Macedonia transition . 0.360 0.492 0.429 
Mexico OECD 0.296 0.248 0.437 0.313 
                                                 
4 Altogether 34,883 observations are dropped. Countries are: Albania, Armenia, Australia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia, 
Croatia, Georgia, Greece, Kyrgyz Republic, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Moldova, New Zealand, Serbia, 
Switzerland and Ukraine.  
5 Albeit East- and West-Germany are unified since 1990, for the purpose of this study East-Germany is treated as 
a transition country. 
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Moldova transition . 0.348 0.222 0.285 
Netherlands OECD 0.069 . 0.053 0.061 
New Zealand OECD . 0.254 . 0.254 
Norway OECD 0.231 0.176 . 0.204 
Poland transition/OECD 0.326 0.167 0.250 0.263 
Portugal OECD 0.212 . 0.204 0.208 
Romania transition 0.416 0.433 0.458 0.435 
Russia transition 0.353 0.273 0.242 0.285 
Serbia transition . 0.360 0.308 0.329 
Slovakia transition/OECD 0.390 0.223 0.203 0.283 
Slovenia transition/OECD 0.340 0.256 0.295 0.296 
Spain OECD 0.153 0.166 0.152 0.155 
Sweden OECD 0.239 0.173 0.175 0.190 
Switzerland OECD . 0.288 . 0.288 
Turkey OECD 0.303 0.466 0.357 0.394 
Ukraine transition . 0.281 0.244 0.270 
UK OECD 0.197 . 0.116 0.165 
USA OECD 0.285 0.317 0.284 0.296 
Total  0.286 0.267 0.237 0.262 
 
To explain the difference between transition countries and established market 
economies with respect to competition beliefs, we control for individual socioeconomic 
factors as described in Table 3 and macroeconomic conditions at the country level (Table 4).  
 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics of independent variables and controls 
Variable Description Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Reference Category 
        
transition Transition Dummy 120002 0.388 0.487 0 1  
        
wave_2 surveyed in 1989-1993 120002 0.400 0.490 0 1 X 
wave_3 surveyed in 1994-1999 120002 0.240 0.427 0 1  
wave_4 surveyed in 1999-2004 120002 0.359 0.480 0 1  
        
wave2_trans interaction term 120002 0.140 0.347 0 1 X 
wave3_trans interaction term 120002 0.123 0.329 0 1  
wave4_trans interaction term 120002 0.124 0.330 0 1  
        
age age 119765 43.228 16.531 15 101  
age_sqr age squared 119765 2141.954 1563.925 225 10201  
female female 120002 0.521 0.500 0 1  
        
inc_quint1 Lowest income quintile 103763 0.196 0.397 0 1  
inc_quint2 2nd income quintile 103763 0.290 0.454 0 1  
inc_quint3 3rd income quintile 103763 0.252 0.434 0 1 X 
inc_quint4 4th income quintile 103763 0.162 0.369 0 1  
inc_quint5 Highest income quintile 103763 0.100 0.299 0 1  
        
stat_single single  119674 0.213 0.409 0 1 X 
stat_married married 119674 0.647 0.478 0 1  
stat_divorced divorced or separated 119674 0.068 0.251 0 1  
stat_widowed widowed  119674 0.073 0.260 0 1  
        
jobstat_full full-time employed 116837 0.452 0.498 0 1 X 
jobstat_part part-time employment 116837 0.068 0.252 0 1  
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jobstat_self self employed 116837 0.065 0.247 0 1  
jobstat_retired retired 116837 0.177 0.382 0 1  
jobstat_wife housewife 116837 0.107 0.309 0 1  
jobstat_student student 116837 0.055 0.228 0 1  
jobstat_unemp unemployed 116837 0.058 0.234 0 1  
jobstat_other other job status 116837 0.018 0.132 0 1  
        
job_manual blue collar job 102302 0.404 0.491 0 1 X 
job_manager leading position 102302 0.082 0.275 0 1  
job_office white collar job 102302 0.368 0.482 0 1  
job_farmer farming 102302 0.053 0.223 0 1  
job_military military 102302 0.009 0.096 0 1  
job_never never had a job 102302 0.083 0.276 0 1  
job_other other 102302 0.001 0.024 0 1  
        
townsize_1 2000 and less inhabitants 100612 0.164 0.370 0 1 X 
townsize_2 2000-5000 inhabitants 100612 0.095 0.293 0 1  
townsize_3 5000-10000 inhabitants 100612 0.078 0.269 0 1  
townsize_4 10000-20000 inhabitants 100612 0.089 0.285 0 1  
townsize_5 20000-50000 inhabitants 100612 0.119 0.324 0 1  
townsize_6 50000-100000 inhabitants 100612 0.095 0.293 0 1  
townsize_7 100000-500000 inhabitants 100612 0.186 0.389 0 1  
townsize_8 500000 and more inhabitants 100612 0.174 0.379 0 1  
        
 
The macro variables of interest are unemployment, per-capita GDP, GPD-growth, 
inflation and the Gini coefficient of the income distribution. Macro data is obtained from the 
World Bank Development Indicator database (World Bank, 2009), the OECD (OECD, 2009) 
and the Standardized World Income Inequality Database (SWIID 2009). Descriptive statistics 
are shown in Table 4. 
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics of macroeconomic variables 
Variable Description # Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
       
inflation inflation rate 107 27.514 97.583 -1.733 948.545 
gdp_growth_wdi real GDP growth rate 107 2.049 4.379 -14.574 10.653 
ln_pcgdp_wdi log per-capita GDP 111 9.687 0.541 8.374 10.578 
unemp_oecd unemployment rate 79 7.360 4.235 0.775 22.964 








Overshooting and Convergence in Competition Beliefs 
 
At first, the evolution of unconditional means of competition beliefs in different 
samples is depicted.  Econometric results using only micro-data are presented in the second 
part of this section. In the third part, macroeconomic variables will be added to the 




More optimistic competition beliefs and subsequent convergence in transition 
countries can be observed for a variety of comparison groups. Average competition beliefs for 
East- and West-Germany with a quadratic fit are shown in Figure 1. The left panel shows the 
mean of the original ten scale variable competition, the right panel shows the mean of the 
binary variable competition_bin10. At the time of reunification, beliefs on competition on 
average have been more positive in East-Germany than in West-Germany. Over time, average 
beliefs of East-Germans converged to the West-German level. The same pattern can be found 
in Figure 2 and Figure 3. In Figure 2 the average competition beliefs of transition countries 
which are OECD members are compared to those of all other OECD countries. In Figure 2a 
and Figure 2b competition and competition_bin10 with a linear and quadratic fit are depicted.  
 
Figure 1: Average levels of competition (left) and competition_bin10 (right) and quadratic fit.  
 
   Figure 2a: Linear fit (left) and quadratic fit for country means of competition.  
 




Figure 2b: Linear fit (left) and quadratic fit (right) for country means of competition_bin10.   
 
In Figure 3, the mean levels of competition_bin10 in all transition countries in the sample are 
compared to those in all non-transition countries.6 
 
Figure 3: Linear fit (left) and quadratic fit for country means of competition_bin10. 
 
 
Econometric Results  
 
The overshooting and convergence we observe in the descriptive data might result 
from conflating factors like cultural differences, structural differences, economic 
performance, level of education and others. To control for these possibly conflating factors, 
multivariate regressions are employed. Using a difference-in-difference estimation approach, 
the basic specification of the logit model takes the form 
(1)   ictitctttcict XWTWTB   ')*(*  
(2)           )0Pr()1Pr( *  ictict BB . 
Competition belief B of individual i, living in country c, being surveyed at time t, is explained 
by individual characteristics iX  , a transition-country dummy cT , wave dummies tW  and the 
interactions of wave and transition dummies. The transition dummy captures the effect of 
living in a transition economy. The interaction variables tell us whether and how the effect of 
                                                 
6 In Appendix C the evolution of competition beliefs is shown for all countries individually. 
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living in a transition economy changes over time. Following the overshooting and 
convergence hypothesis we expect a positive but over time diminishing effect of cT  on the 
probability of optimistic competition beliefs (i.e. 0,0  t ).  
As already mentioned, the limited dependent variable is constructed from the 
competition variable with cut-off 10, i.e. only individuals who unambiguously state that 
competition is good, will be coded 1, all others zero. The estimation is first performed on the 
sample of OECD countries; in a second step the exercise is repeated using the full sample. On 
each sample three models are estimated. Model 1 only includes time dummies, transition 
dummies and interactions thereof.7 Model 2 is extended with the whole set of individual 
controls. Finally, model 3 additionally includes country dummies to control for unobservable 
country specific characteristics.8 The results are presented in Table 5. All six estimations 
convey the same message. Living in a transition country significantly increases the probability 
of believing that market competition is good. The coefficients for the interaction dummies are 
negative and significant for both waves; the positive effect of living in a transition country on 
the probability for positive competition beliefs diminishes over time. With respect to 
competition beliefs, transition countries and experienced market economies get more similar 
over time.9 
As shown by Moulton (1990), the inclusion of country dummies and other group or 
country specific variables, is likely to bias estimated standard errors downward. Accordingly, 
the results are derived using a robust estimator taking account of within country clustering.  
Table 5:  Main Results 
 OECD OECD OECD full sample full sample full sample 
competition_bin1       
wave_3 0.022 -0.014 -0.329* 0.022 -0.030 -0.327* 
 (0.11) (-0.09) (-2.17) (0.11) (-0.20) (-2.17) 
wave_4 -0.175+ -0.119 -0.185+ -0.175+ -0.114 -0.182+ 
 (-1.79) (-1.11) (-1.72) (-1.80) (-1.07) (-1.65) 
transition 0.847*** 0.941*** 0.594*** 0.828*** 0.940*** 0.541*** 
 (4.12) (3.93) (8.70) (5.35) (4.85) (7.81) 
wave3_trans -0.894** -1.017*** -0.532** -0.682** -0.606* -0.229 
 (-3.06) (-3.45) (-2.65) (-2.63) (-2.47) (-1.01) 
wave4_trans -0.607** -0.690** -0.524* -0.450** -0.551** -0.385+ 
 (-2.94) (-2.96) (-2.21) (-2.61) (-2.74) (-1.88) 
age  -0.005 0.003  -0.007 -0.002 
  (-1.11) (0.58)  (-1.57) (-0.35) 
age_sqr  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 
  (1.45) (0.40)  (1.30) (0.62) 
female  -0.215*** -0.215***  -0.234*** -0.231*** 
                                                 
7 Note that time dummies are in fact wave dummies. The use of year dummies does not change central results. 
Some year dummies are insignificant and convergence can not be observed for all year-transition interactions, 
probably due to small case numbers for some years.  
8 For estimation equations for model 2 and 3 see Item B1 in the Appendix B. 
9 Estimations on the sample of East- and West-Germany alone, also confirm overshooting and convergence in 
competition beliefs. These and all following results that are not reported in full detail can be obtained from the 
author upon request. 
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  (-7.13) (-7.12)  (-8.95) (-8.97) 
inc_quint1  -0.098 -0.132*  0.003 -0.052 
  (-1.63) (-2.56)  (0.03) (-0.95) 
inc_quint2  -0.072+ -0.097*  -0.032 -0.051 
  (-1.90) (-2.54)  (-0.82) (-1.36) 
inc_quint4  -0.012 0.001  0.022 0.033 
  (-0.23) (0.02)  (0.46) (0.71) 
inc_quint5  0.054 0.107+  0.127* 0.167** 
  (0.78) (1.84)  (2.09) (3.25) 
stat_married  0.063 0.016  0.070+ 0.033 
  (1.48) (0.45)  (1.93) (1.08) 
stat_divorced  0.093 0.035  0.073 0.051 
  (1.61) (0.74)  (1.29) (1.23) 
stat_widowed  0.081 0.028  0.032 0.003 
  (1.31) (0.52)  (0.58) (0.08) 
jobstat_part  -0.160** -0.160***  -0.159*** -0.160*** 
  (-3.28) (-3.71)  (-3.97) (-4.39) 
jobstat_self  0.223*** 0.133*  0.220*** 0.124* 
  (3.29) (2.45)  (3.63) (2.36) 
jobstat_retired  0.011 0.035  -0.030 -0.019 
  (0.23) (1.05)  (-0.57) (-0.43) 
jobstat_wife  0.120+ 0.097*  0.130* 0.107* 
  (1.81) (2.10)  (1.97) (2.17) 
jobstat_student  -0.048 -0.082  -0.038 -0.070 
  (-0.27) (-0.54)  (-0.27) (-0.55) 
jobstat_unemp  -0.047 -0.013  -0.043 -0.019 
  (-0.66) (-0.21)  (-0.66) (-0.33) 
jobstat_other  -0.141 -0.079  -0.064 -0.042 
  (-1.31) (-0.68)  (-0.62) (-0.39) 
job_manager  0.389*** 0.401***  0.416*** 0.426*** 
  (5.96) (6.36)  (6.93) (7.35) 
job_office  0.042 0.045  0.089+ 0.091* 
  (0.75) (0.99)  (1.68) (2.10) 
job_farmer  -0.082 -0.103  -0.093 -0.141* 
  (-0.80) (-1.61)  (-1.19) (-2.43) 
job_military  0.285** 0.283*  0.315*** 0.321*** 
  (2.62) (2.56)  (3.79) (3.81) 
job_never  -0.026 -0.022  0.012 0.000 
  (-0.26) (-0.29)  (0.14) (0.00) 
townsize_2  -0.002 -0.035  0.039 -0.018 
  (-0.05) (-0.51)  (0.80) (-0.34) 
townsize_3  0.038 0.074  0.118+ 0.132* 
  (0.57) (1.36)  (1.76) (2.36) 
townsize_4  -0.072 0.035  -0.034 0.044 
  (-0.76) (0.57)  (-0.40) (0.73) 
townsize_5  -0.143 -0.066  -0.054 -0.002 
  (-1.52) (-1.40)  (-0.65) (-0.03) 
townsize_6  0.128 0.135*  0.196** 0.177*** 
  (1.56) (2.42)  (2.74) (3.61) 
townsize_7  -0.040 -0.056  0.055 0.028 
  (-0.51) (-1.25)  (0.72) (0.52) 
townsize_8  0.058 -0.063  0.125 0.037 
  (0.66) (-0.98)  (1.62) (0.55) 
_cons -1.239*** -1.175*** -1.126*** -1.239*** -1.192*** -1.053*** 
 (-12.91) (-9.45) (-13.49) (-12.95) (-8.67) (-11.02) 
Country Dummies  No No Yes No No Yes 
N 98496 57114 57114 120002 71948 71948 
pseudo R2 0.016 0.028 0.053 0.018 0.027 0.048 
Notes: 1) Logit regression with competition_bin1 as dependent variable. 2) t-statistics in parentheses.  
3) Standard errors are robust to within country clustering. 4) + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.   
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Let’s shortly consider the empirical results with respect to other determinants of 
competition beliefs. Age has no effect on competition beliefs. Women are less likely to favour 
market competition. The self-employed have a higher probability and part time workers a 
lower probability than fully employed workers to judge competition a good thing. Managers 
and army members have more faith in the market system than blue collar workers. High 
incomes are significantly positively associated with competition beliefs. For marriage status 
and town size results are ambiguous and do not allow clear-cut conclusions regarding their 
influence on competition beliefs.  
To get a notion of the quantitative importance of respective variables, OLS estimations 
are performed (see Appendix A, Table A2). The robustness of the central overshooting and 
convergence result is confirmed with a wide array of different estimation methods and 
specifications, as discussed below.  
 
Macroeconomic Influences and Robustness 
Macroeconomic variables might convey important information on markets and 
competition which could explain both, the difference and convergence in competition beliefs. 
To incorporate the effect of macro variables, the standard specification is estimated with the 
inclusion of the inflation rate (inflation), the log of per-capita GDP (ln_pcgdp_wdi), GDP 
growth rate (gdp_growth), unemployment (unemp_oecd) and the Gini coefficient of market 
incomes (gini_gross_swiid), each in turn and all simultaneously. Again the robust variance 
estimator, taking account of within-country clustering, is used. Results for the OECD sample 
are shown in Table 6, for the full sample in Table 7.  
 As can be seen in Table 6, inflation has a negative effect on competition beliefs. The 
other macro variables do not show a statistically significant relation to competition beliefs. In 
all five models the overshooting and convergence of competition beliefs is confirmed.  
 
Table 6: Results with macroeconomic variables on OECD sample 
 OECD OECD OECD OECD OECD 
competition_bin1      
wave_3 -0.335* -0.333* -0.305+ -0.325+ -0.292+ 
 (-2.21) (-2.18) (-1.91) (-1.69) (-1.86) 
wave_4 -0.203* -0.193+ -0.140 -0.107 -0.152 
 (-1.97) (-1.83) (-0.89) (-1.01) (-1.19) 
transition 0.659*** 0.635*** 0.595*** 0.704*** 0.588*** 
 (8.68) (10.38) (8.54) (7.80) (8.36) 
wave3_trans -0.645** -0.611** -0.530** -0.716** -0.519* 
 (-3.20) (-2.98) (-2.65) (-2.64) (-2.32) 
wave4_trans -0.781** -0.678** -0.536* -0.990** -0.503* 
 (-2.64) (-3.13) (-2.18) (-3.02) (-2.16) 
inflation -0.003*     
 (-2.51)     
gdp_growth_wdi  0.005    
  (0.38)    
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ln_pcgdp_wdi   -0.207   
   (-0.29)   
unemp_oecd    0.032  
    (1.11)  
gini_gross_swiid     -0.012 
     (-0.64) 
Personal 
characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Income quintiles Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Marriage status  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Job-status  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Job dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Townsize  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
_cons -1.129*** -1.157*** 0.974 -1.216*** -0.653 
 (-13.19) (-12.67) (0.13) (-9.30) (-0.88) 
N 55485 55485 57114 49348 56373 
pseudo R2 0.052 0.052 0.053 0.057 0.053 
Notes: 1) Logit regression with competition_bin1 as dependent variable. 2) t-statistics in parentheses.  
3) Standard errors are robust to within country clustering. 4) + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.   
 
The estimations on the full sample (Table 7) show no statistical significant effect of 
any macro variable included. The overshooting and convergence effect persists.  Note that the 
estimations shown in Table 7 do not include job information and information on townsize. 
Some 26,000 observations are lost with the inclusion of these variables. Also the overshooting 
and convergence results become somewhat weaker. Results also including these variables are 
shown in Table A3 in Appendix A. 
Table 7: Results with macroeconomic variables on full sample 
 full sample full sample full sample full sample full sample 
competition_bin1      
wave_3 -0.137 -0.121 -0.120 -0.072 -0.106 
 (-0.90) (-0.78) (-0.80) (-0.43) (-0.65) 
wave_4 -0.139 -0.136 -0.104 -0.095 -0.110 
 (-1.50) (-1.53) (-0.97) (-1.12) (-1.04) 
transition 0.620*** 0.573*** 0.607*** 0.771*** 0.546*** 
 (6.81) (5.79) (6.01) (7.02) (6.08) 
wave3_trans -0.588* -0.531* -0.579* -1.076*** -0.444+ 
 (-2.32) (-2.18) (-2.22) (-3.93) (-1.87) 
wave4_trans -0.579** -0.427+ -0.524* -0.797** -0.407* 
 (-3.04) (-1.87) (-2.38) (-2.67) (-2.22) 
inflation -0.001     
 (-1.56)     
gdp_growth_wdi  -0.017    
  (-1.18)    
ln_pcgdp_wdi   -0.156   
   (-0.36)   
unemp_oecd    -0.004  
    (-0.18)  
gini_gross_swiid     -0.017 
     (-0.99) 
Personal 
characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Income quintiles Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Marriage status  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Labour market 
status  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
_cons -0.899*** -0.843*** 0.693 -1.024*** -0.211 
 (-9.59) (-7.41) (0.16) (-9.86) (-0.32) 
N 96038 96038 99668 69516 99137 
pseudo R2 0.049 0.049 0.049 0.057 0.050 
Notes: 1) Logit regression with competition_bin1 as dependent variable. 2) t-statistics in parentheses.  
3) Standard errors are robust to within country clustering. 4) + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.   
If all macro variables are included simultaneously, the overshooting and convergence 
effect persists. This is shown for the full sample in Table 8. Unemployment and the Gini of  
Table 8: Results with simultaneously including all macro variables 
 full sample full sample full sample full sample full sample 
competition_bin1      
wave_3 0.145 0.166 0.168 -0.038 -0.142 
 (1.13) (1.31) (1.32) (-0.25) (-1.11) 
wave_4 0.287 0.376+ 0.379+ -0.171 -0.321+ 
 (1.47) (1.86) (1.87) (-0.70) (-1.78) 
transition 0.774*** 0.766*** 0.762*** 0.787*** 0.812*** 
 (5.78) (6.10) (6.05) (6.20) (6.79) 
wave3_trans -1.054*** -1.034*** -1.031*** -1.304*** -1.217*** 
 (-3.55) (-3.52) (-3.51) (-3.44) (-4.20) 
wave4_trans -0.898** -0.834* -0.833* -1.012* -1.167** 
 (-2.67) (-2.31) (-2.31) (-2.45) (-3.00) 
inflation 0.004 0.007 0.007 -0.006 -0.040*** 
 (0.24) (0.50) (0.51) (-0.32) (-3.93) 
gdp_growth_wdi 0.003 0.008 0.009 -0.014 -0.073*** 
 (0.26) (0.70) (0.71) (-1.01) (-4.91) 
ln_pcgdp_wdi -1.948* -2.214** -2.211** 0.545 0.525 
 (-2.37) (-2.75) (-2.74) (0.43) (0.53) 
unemp_oecd -0.047* -0.040+ -0.040+ -0.016 -0.045 
 (-2.36) (-1.86) (-1.87) (-0.46) (-0.88) 
gini_gross_swiid -0.024 -0.035* -0.035* -0.024 -0.000 
 (-1.59) (-2.10) (-2.12) (-1.52) (-0.02) 
Personal 
characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Income quintiles  No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Marriage status  No No Yes Yes Yes 
Labour  market 
status  No No No Yes Yes 
Job status No No No Yes Yes 
Townsize  No No No No Yes 
Country Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
_cons 19.664* 22.801** 22.831** -5.517 -5.930 
 (2.34) (2.74) (2.74) (-0.43) (-0.59) 
N 82074 69154 68983 57664 46978 
pseudo R2 0.050 0.055 0.055 0.060 0.059 
Notes: 1) Logit regression with competition_bin1 as dependent variable. 2) t-statistics in parentheses.  
3) Standard errors are robust to within country clustering. 4) + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.   
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market incomes show some negative association with competition beliefs; the other macro 
controls show ambiguous effects. Results are very similar for the OECD sample and will not 
be reported.  
There is ample evidence that preferences for redistribution differ between people from 
post communist countries and those from long time market economies (Murthi and Tiongson 
2008, Corneo and Grüner 2002, Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln 2007). Thus, it is conceivable 
that the determinants of belief formation are different if socialised under a different system. In 
order to analyse whether determinants of competition beliefs differ between market 
economies and transition countries, an unconstrained logit model is estimated with all 
independent variables being interacted with the transition dummy. The constrained and 
unconstrained models are compared using the likelihood ration test (LR Test) and the 
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC). Both tests refute the unconstrained model if estimated 
on the OECD sample, but recommend it when the estimation is done on the full sample. 
Estimation results with robust standard errors for the OECD and the full sample are shown in 
Table 9.  
Table 9. Unrestricted Model - OECD & Full Sample 
 (1) (2) (1) (2) 
competition_bin1 OECD OECD Full sample Full sample 
OECD-Sample     
wave_3 -0.228 -0.161 -0.228 -0.161 
 (-1.35) (-1.01) (-1.35) (-1.01) 
wave_4 -0.214+ -0.151 -0.214+ -0.151 
 (-1.91) (-1.45) (-1.91) (-1.45) 
transition 0.614** 0.475* 0.757*** 0.585*** 
 (3.14) (2.57) (5.25) (3.34) 
wave3_trans -0.695** -0.781* -0.473* -0.456+ 
 (-2.98) (-2.49) (-2.12) (-1.85) 
wave4_trans -0.525* -0.603** -0.410* -0.408* 




Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Income quintiles and 
interactions Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Marriage status and 
interactions No Yes No Yes 
Labour  market status 
and interactions No Yes No Yes 
Job status and 
interactions No Yes No Yes 
Country Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 83439 69849 103660 86305 
pseudo R2 0.051 0.056 0.050 0.053 
Notes: 1) Logit regression with competition_bin1 as dependent variable. 2) t-statistics in parentheses.  
3) Standard errors are robust to within country clustering. 4) + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.   
 
The overshooting and convergence hypothesis once more is confirmed. But there are 
some more interesting results. See the actual coefficients for these estimates, fully reported in 
 18
Table A4 in Appendix A. While the effect of gender is independent of cultural influences, the 
negative effect of age only arises in transition economies. This age effect is consistent with 
the effect of ideology which is more deeply engrained in older individuals (Alesina and 
Fuchs-Schündeln 2007, Eble and Koeva 2002) and the devaluation of system specific human 
capital of which older persons have accumulated more (Doyle and Fidrmuc 2003, Guriev and 
Zhuravskaya 2009). The negative effect of individual unemployment on competition beliefs 
only pertains in transition countries. In contrast, the effect of part time employment and self-
employment is observed for all countries.  
 
So far competition beliefs have been analysed, using competition_bin10 as dependent 
variable. This binary variable has been coded from competition, a ten point Likert scaled 
variable, with cut-off point ten. It might well be that results are driven by the choice of the 
cut-off point. To exclude this possibility, the basic results (Table 5) are also estimated with 
modified dependent variables with cut-off point nine, eight, and seven. The overshooting and 
convergence effect is confirmed for all three alternative dependent variables. Results are 
presented in Table A5 in Appendix A. The overshooting and convergence hypothesis is 
confirmed.  
All specifications presented so far, have been re-estimated, using ordered logit and 
ordinary least square on the original competition variable. All estimations reproduce the 
overshooting and convergence result.10 Basic estimation with OLS are shown in Table A2 in 
Appendix A. 
 
Competition Beliefs and Support for the Implementation of Markets 
 
A central element of the transition process is the introduction of competitive markets. 
While competition is a universal phenomenon inherent in evolution, it is often and to a large 
extent associated with the way a market economy works.11 It is this prevalence of competition 
in market economies, as compared to other form of social organisation, which allows for the 
presupposition that competition beliefs are indicative for individuals’ attitudes and beliefs 
toward free competitive markets. These in turn affect the support for economic reforms during 
transition. This claim is now empirically substantiated.  
Simple correlations between individual competition beliefs and questions regarding 
markets and market reforms provide first indicative evidence. Correlation coefficients of 
individual answers are calculated for each country and time point separately. If people think 
                                                 
10 Results can be obtained from the author upon request. 
11 Independent of a society’s economic organisation, there is competition for sexual partners, social prestige and 
the like. 
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that success results from hard work rather than luck or connections, this expresses a belief in 
the functioning of markets and the fairness of market results (Corneo 2001, Corneo and 
Grüner 2002, Benabou and Tirole 2006). In all countries in the sample, there is a tendency 
that people with more positive competition beliefs also think that hard work brings success.12 
On average the correlation coefficient is .26 (.16 to .34) in transition countries and .33 (.12 to 
.54) in established market economies. In wave 2 (1989-1993) there is an item stating that the 
“country’s economic system needs fundamental changes”.13 In transition countries, 
individuals who feel positive about competition, tend to see a need for fundamental changes 
with correlation coefficients ranging from .02 to .21. On the contrary, in long time market 
economies the correlation is largely negative ranging from -0.27 to .07. However, since 
correlations only offer weak evidence for our claim that competition beliefs are intimately 
connected to political support for economic reforms, the effect of competition beliefs on the 
attitudes toward the need for fundamental systemic change is analysed using multivariate 
estimation.   
To analyse individual attitudes toward the need for changes of the economic system, 
the dependent variable need_change is used. It takes on higher values with stronger 
agreement to the question “This country's economic system needs fundamental changes”. The 
question was only survey in wave 2. Mean values across countries are depicted in Table A6 in 
Appendix A. Performing ordered logit estimations, the effect of the binary competition 
variable, used as dependent variable for the analysis of the overshooting and convergence 
effect is estimated. The first specification only includes personal characteristics, country 
dummies and the binary variable indicating strong competition beliefs (competition_bin10). 
Then a transition dummy and an interaction term are included; further control variables are 
added. Results are shown in Table 10. Strong competition beliefs have a positive and 
significant effect on the probability for holding strong reform attitudes. The interaction term 
indicates that this effect is stronger in transition countries. These results are reproduced with 
dummies for all levels of competition beliefs and interactions thereof. Results, which are 
shown in Table A7 in Appendix A, confirm that it is mainly in transition countries that 
competition beliefs have an important effect on attitudes toward economic reform. These 
results are robust to variations of the estimation method (Ordered Logit, Logit and OLS) and 
coding of the dependent variable (e.g. need_change_bin5).  
 
 
                                                 
12 For detailed wording see Item B2 in Appendix B. 





Table 10: The effect of competition beliefs on support for economic reform 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
need_change      
competition_bin10 0.451*** 0.243*** 0.206*** 0.199*** 0.181*** 
 (10.01) (8.61) (6.59) (6.11) (5.14) 
trans_comp10  0.449*** 0.483*** 0.494*** 0.470*** 
  (9.65) (9.89) (9.92) (8.33) 
transition  5.012*** 4.998*** 4.998*** 4.993*** 
  (51.81) (50.83) (50.66) (49.84) 
cut1      
_cons -3.414*** -3.811*** -3.757*** -3.797*** -3.845*** 
 (-7.68) (-43.47) (-38.55) (-35.44) (-31.62) 
cut2      
_cons -1.856*** -2.127*** -2.073*** -2.106*** -2.154*** 
 (-7.12) (-25.80) (-22.50) (-20.63) (-18.51) 
cut3      
_cons -0.852*** -1.030*** -1.004*** -1.063*** -1.144*** 
 (-6.36) (-12.68) (-11.04) (-10.52) (-9.94) 
cut4      
_cons 1.019*** 0.982*** 1.008*** 0.973*** 0.928*** 
 (12.75) (12.10) (11.10) (9.65) (8.07) 
Personal 
characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Income quintiles No No No Yes Yes 
Marriage status  No No No Yes Yes 
Job-status  No No No Yes Yes 
Job dummies No No No No Yes 
Townsize  No No No No Yes 
Country Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 42475 42475 37148 35737 28461 
pseudo R2 0.081 0.122 0.128 0.132 0.133 
Notes: 1) Ordered logit regression with need_change as dependent variable. 2) t-statistics in parentheses.  
3) Standard errors are robust to within country clustering. 4) + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.   
 
 
There is arguably an endogeneity problem if competition beliefs are used as an 
explanatory variable for reform attitudes. For lack of a suitable instrument, this problem can 
not be tackled and estimation results might be biased. However, the unconditional correlations 
together with the regressions show the qualitative relation between competition beliefs and 
reform attitudes. We conclude that at the onset of transition, optimistic beliefs on the effect of 
market competition were conducive to strong reform attitudes in transition countries. Those 




Why did Competition Beliefs Overshoot?  
There are a number of possible accounts why competition beliefs overshoot. Very 
optimistic beliefs in the merits of competition in transition countries at the onset of transition 
could simply result from wrong expectations. People in transition countries knew about the 
relative material wealth in long time market economies and mistakenly believed that once 
market competition is introduced, their living standard will rise to similar levels. In fact, there 
is empirical evidence of the public holding biased beliefs on economic issues (Caplan 2002). 
There are also a number of theoretical approaches that elaborate upon standard economic 
theory to account for systematic biases. Caplan (2003) reviews these concepts and augments 
Downs’s argument of rational ignorance to rational irrationality.14 In contrast to mistakes and 
limited rationality, Doyle and Walsh (2007) claim that voting behaviour in the Czech 
Republic has been forward looking and the expectations of the electorate largely correct. We 
now present a simple model that shows how biased expert advice might result in overshooting 
and convergence of competition beliefs in a setting of full rationality with uncertainty. Our 
modelling strategy is inspired by Corneo (2006), who put forward the link between media 
capture and inequality. An empirical investigation of that link is offered by Petrova (2008).  
 
A Simple Model 
There are two countries A and B. At time 0t , only the representative agent of 
country A has experienced a market economy. Country B is about to begin the transition from 
a planned to a market economy and must decide whether certain goods and services are to be 
provided by the government or through markets. In the long run, markets are expected to yield 
a welfare gain given by 
 ,VUU   
where U  and V  are constants, 0V , and the state of the world   can take two values, 0 and 
1. Markets perform better if the state is 1 rather than 0. The state of the world is unknown to 
agents; without loss of generality, each state occurs with equal probability. 
Long-term utility is not experienced until time 2t . At 0t , agents in country A 
directly receive a signal about the benefit of markets (first-hand experience). Agents in 
country B merely receive a report about that signal from a media expert (IMF, big shot, local 
guru, local pundit, anchorman...). The media industry has access to privileged information 
about the state of the world through the expert and uses a technology to communicate 
                                                 
14 His argument boils down to the familiar argument that no rational agent will choose full rationality if its 
marginal benefit is smaller than marginal cost of information collection and processing. 
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messages to the representative agent. Specifically, the media expert's superior information 
about the underlying state ω comes from a signal }1,0{0 s . With probability )1,21(p , this 
signal is equal to the true state, while with probability p1  the agents are misinformed about 
the state. The media expert reports a message }1,0{r  about the state of the world to agent B. 
The media expert may be one of three types and her type is her private information. 
With prior probability   the expert is pro-market and always reports 1 irrespective of the 
signal that she observes. With probability   the expert is anti-market and always reports 0. 
With probability  1  the expert is unbiased and truthfully reports the signal. The expert's 
type and the signal are independently distributed. Agents' beliefs in country B are formed 
according to Bayes's rule, as implied by the expert's report and the agents’ priors about both 
the state of the world and the expert's type. 
Between time 0t  and 1t  transition occurs and agent B also experiences a market 
economy. At 1t , both agents A and B observe a new signal 1s , drawn from the same 
distribution as 0s , and revise their beliefs about the virtues of markets. At 2t  the state of 
the world is realized and agents receive the associated long-term utility gain. 
 
Equilibrium Beliefs at the onset of Transition 
The inference problem of agent A at 0t  is straightforward: if the agent observes 1, 
he assigns probability p to the good state )1(  , while if the signal is 0 the assigned 
probability is p1 . The inference problem of agent B is more difficult. Because of the 
possible expert's bias, agent B will not completely believe the media. The agent realizes that 
the reports of biased media convey no information, while with honest media an optimistic 
report on the virtues of markets means that the good state has probability p . 
Without first-hand experience of markets, agent B assigns probability )1|1Pr(  rq   to 









If 1 , the probability to hear good news from an anti-market expert is zero, while 
that probability is 1 if the expert is pro-market. If the expert is honest, the probability to hear 
good news is p, i.e. the informativeness of the signal that she has observed. Thus, 
pr )1()1|1Pr(   . By the same token, )1)(1()0|1Pr( pr   . 







)1()1( ppq . 
This probability is smaller than p  because the media are not entirely credible. Therefore, 
rationality puts an upper bound to the extent of beliefs manipulation by means of media 
reports. The probability q  assigned to state 1 is however strictly larger than 1/2, the prior 
probability of that state: ),21( pq . Conversely, if the media's report is pessimistic, the 






)1)(1(' ppq . 
In this case, one has )21,1(' pq  . 
 
Transition and Belief Change 
At time 1t , both agents, A and B, directly observe signal 1s  and revise their beliefs 
about the underlying state of the world in a Bayesian fashion. To illustrate, consider first 
agent A when the independent draws are 010  ss . Then, the probability assigned at 1t  








which is smaller than the probability assigned at time 0t  , p1 . 
Consider now agent B observing 01 s  after having received an optimistic message from the 
expert. In this case, she assigns probability )0,1|1Pr( 1  srQ   to the good state; by 










If instead agent B received 0r  at 0t , the probability that she assigns to the good state 










It is straightforward to show that qQ   and '' qQ  , i.e. B’s beliefs about the long term 





Model and Empirical Findings 
In the data we observe that at the beginning of transition individuals from transition 
countries held more optimistic views about the market system than individuals from western 
countries. This is consistent with the model only if 00 s , in which case agent A expects a 
long-term benefit Vp)1(  , which is smaller than the benefit expected by agent B ( Vq'  or 
qV , depending on the media report). Notice that in the special case where anti-market experts 
are virtually impossible and thus   goes to zero, 'q  goes to )1( p .15 In this case, observing 
more optimistic beliefs in transition countries implies that 1r  occurred. Since the true 
signal was 0, we can deduce that the media expert was biased in favour of markets if 0 . 
In the data we also observe that in transition countries attitudes towards markets became less 
favourable over time. This is consistent with the model only if 01 s . 
To sum up, the observed overshooting of beliefs about the virtues of markets can be 
rationalized in terms of media bias along two alternative lines: 
    1. Pro-market experts reported optimistic messages that were contradicted by experience; 
    2. Anti-market or honest experts reported realistic messages that were not completely 
believed by agents because they thought the experts to be biased against the market system. 
Is the model also consistent with a convergence of beliefs across countries? 
At time 0, the belief gap between agent B and agent A is predicted to be either )1( pq   or 
































                                                 
15 At the onset of transition it was often stated that the failure of communism proofed the dominance of the 
market system. In this historical context an anti-market expert indeed seems virtually impossible. 
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Inequality (6) and (7) always hold for given assumptions, so that the model predicts 
convergence, irrespective whether the expert is pro market and transmits a biased signal or 
whether an honest signal is discounted by the agents. 
The path of transition towards a market economy entails the timing of reform policies 
and the depth of reform, i.e. the scope of privatization. The scope of privatization thereby 
refers to the decision as to what services (e.g. schooling, health, pensions, utilities) should be 
provided by markets or the state; a question not only contested in transition countries, but in 
experienced market economies, too (World Bank 2005). The timing of reform determines the 
sequencing of measures and accordingly determines the distribution of the cost of reform over 
time. The model raises the possibility that an expert with access to mass media transmitted a 
biased report about the desirability of markets, inducing exaggerated competition beliefs. As a 
result, both, the scope of privatization as well as the timing of reform might have extended 
beyond the level chosen by a correctly informed electorate.  
Conclusion 
The introduction of market institutions in former centrally planned economies is 
expected to foster development and bring about convergence toward the living conditions of 
older market economies. Transition countries are expected to converge to and in fact do 
converge to older market economies with respect to a large number of measures of economic 
activity (World Bank 2002). The current paper shows that not only living conditions, but also 
beliefs converge. While belief convergence seems natural given the general convergence 
tendency, it is in fact surprising that initial levels of positive competition beliefs are much 
higher in transition countries than in experienced market economies.  
At the onset of transition there was basically no experience with market competition in 
these countries. Expert advice was crucial for individual perceptions on the desirability of 
markets and influenced support for market oriented reforms. It is argued that overly positive 
beliefs in competition contributed to the possibility of introducing widespread economic 
reforms in transition countries. It is shown that in transition countries more positive 
competition beliefs increased demand for fundamental changes in the economic system. Once 
the basic market institutions were installed, individuals made actual experiences in a 
competitive market and accordingly updated their beliefs. Average beliefs in transition and 
established market economies converge. A learning model shows that such belief dynamics 
can result from rational belief formation, if an outside expert supplies biased information 
about the desirability of markets to people in transition countries.  
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Guriev and Zhuravskaya (2009) identify a happiness gap in transition countries. They 
explain a large part of this gap with decreasing supply of public goods, economic instability 
and the deterioration of human capital. However, decreasing happiness levels might also arise 
from disappointed expectations with respect to the results of transition. Köszegi and Rabin 
(2006) introduce a model where expectations serve as a reference point for reference 
dependent utility. If outcomes are less positive than expected, utility levels are low.  In this 
sense it is conceivable that a part of the decrease in happiness levels during transition could 
result from disappointment on the merits of the market and competition, which did not match 
high expectations, i.e. positive competition beliefs. This interpretation is hypothetical and it is 
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Table A1: Number of observations and survey year 
 Wave 2 Wave 3 Wave 4  
Country Freq. Years Freq. Years Freq. Years Total Freq. 
Austria 1,431 1990 0 . 1,471 1999 2,902 
Belarus 973 1990 1,902 1996 906 2000 3,781 
Belgium 2,569 1990 0 . 1,865 1999 4,434 
Bulgaria 970 1990 982 1997 919 1999 2,871 
Canada 1,713 1990 0 . 1,913 2000 3,626 
Chile 1,473 1990 992 1996 1,177 2000 3,642 
Czech 
Republic 2,979 1991 1,102 1998 1,870 1999 5,951 
Denmark 987 1990 0 . 987 1999 1,974 
Estonia 960 1990 993 1996 950 1999 2,903 
Finland 566 1990 968 1996 1,016 2000 2,550 
France 970 1990 0 . 1,585 1999 2,555 
Germany 3,276 1990 1,991 1997 1,928 1999 7,195 
Hungary 914 1991 630 1998 932 1999 2,476 
Iceland 687 1990 0 . 959 1999 1,646 
Ireland 987 1990 0 . 977 1999 1,964 
Italy 1,887 1990 0 . 1,905 1999 3,792 
Japan 846 1990 958 1995 1,251 2000 3,055 
Korea, Rep. 1,235 1990 1,239 1996 1,199 2001 3,673 
Latvia 832 1990 1,177 1996 961 1999 2,970 
Lithuania 932 1990 953 1997 924 1999 2,809 
Mexico 1,472 1990 2,236 1996 1,383 2000 5,091 
Netherlands 987 1990 0 . 992 1999 1,979 
Norway 1,209 1990 1,120 1996 0 . 2,329 
Poland 1,816 1990 1,035 1997 1,043 1999 3,894 
Portugal 1,115 1990 0 . 961 1999 2,076 
Romania 1,061 1993 1,182 1998 981 1999 3,224 
Russia 1,739 1990 1,849 1995 2,263 1999 5,851 
Slovakia 1,513 1991 1,052 1998 1,254 1999 3,819 
Slovenia 914 1992 970 1995 982 1999 2,866 
Spain 3,801 1990 1,156 1995 2,277 2000 7,234 
Sweden 1,010 1990 1,003 1996 2,004 1999 4,017 
Turkey 992 1990 1,859 1996 1,127 2001 3,978 
United 
Kingdom 1,454 1990 0 . 968 1999 2,422 
United States 1,752 1990 1,502 1995 1,199 1999 4,453 
Total 48,022 1990 28,851 1996 43,129 1999 120,002 
 
 
Table A2. Ordered least square estimations to gauge the quantitative relevance of estimates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
competition       
age 0.001 -0.006 -0.008 -0.009 -0.008 -0.006 
 (0.24) (-1.37) (-1.36) (-1.39) (-1.32) (-0.95) 
age_sqr -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (-0.81) (1.23) (1.35) (1.45) (1.32) (1.06) 
female -0.318*** -0.304*** -0.298*** -0.295*** -0.338*** -0.328*** 
 (-11.77) (-11.13) (-10.89) (-12.09) (-12.20) (-11.05) 
wave_3 -0.223+ -0.253+ -0.251+ -0.164 -0.173 -0.320** 
 (-1.89) (-1.84) (-1.84) (-1.47) (-1.47) (-3.10) 
wave_4 -0.274** -0.282** -0.280** -0.216** -0.210* -0.265** 
 (-3.41) (-3.09) (-3.08) (-2.88) (-2.55) (-3.31) 
transition 0.329*** 0.376*** 0.373*** 0.394*** 0.422*** 0.393*** 
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 (4.50) (5.29) (5.29) (6.08) (6.66) (6.34) 
wave3_trans -0.383* -0.384* -0.385* -0.412* -0.363+ -0.224 
 (-2.39) (-2.18) (-2.20) (-2.54) (-1.87) (-1.39) 
wave4_trans -0.424** -0.412** -0.409** -0.448** -0.443** -0.348* 
 (-3.12) (-2.86) (-2.84) (-3.26) (-2.93) (-2.26) 
inc_quint1  -0.290*** -0.277*** -0.270*** -0.220*** -0.247*** 
  (-5.88) (-5.25) (-5.71) (-4.60) (-4.75) 
inc_quint2  -0.120*** -0.117*** -0.129*** -0.106*** -0.105** 
  (-3.88) (-3.72) (-4.84) (-3.83) (-3.34) 
inc_quint4  0.160*** 0.160*** 0.137*** 0.096** 0.084* 
  (5.44) (5.51) (5.46) (3.13) (2.36) 
inc_quint5  0.445*** 0.443*** 0.413*** 0.349*** 0.345*** 
  (12.41) (12.59) (12.67) (9.04) (7.64) 
stat_married   0.021 0.031 0.024 0.012 
   (0.50) (0.79) (0.60) (0.27) 
stat_divorced   -0.027 -0.009 -0.016 -0.032 
   (-0.58) (-0.21) (-0.35) (-0.66) 
stat_widowed   -0.057 -0.043 -0.042 -0.034 
   (-1.08) (-0.85) (-0.79) (-0.58) 
jobstat_part    -0.121** -0.110** -0.143** 
    (-3.05) (-2.80) (-3.51) 
jobstat_self    0.151* 0.086 0.085+ 
    (2.72) (1.39) (1.72) 
jobstat_retired    -0.056 -0.027 -0.053 
    (-1.18) (-0.59) (-1.34) 
jobstat_wife    -0.022 0.020 0.055 
    (-0.35) (0.42) (1.35) 
jobstat_student    0.103* 0.061 0.027 
    (2.22) (0.71) (0.28) 
jobstat_unemp    -0.305*** -0.284*** -0.322*** 
    (-5.94) (-4.40) (-5.13) 
jobstat_other    -0.055 -0.003 -0.088 
    (-0.73) (-0.04) (-0.86) 
job_manager     0.481*** 0.561*** 
     (10.48) (12.30) 
job_office     0.277*** 0.267*** 
     (8.27) (8.54) 
job_farmer     -0.045 -0.053 
     (-0.81) (-1.11) 
job_military     0.472*** 0.449*** 
     (5.66) (5.01) 
job_never     0.135+ 0.196** 
     (2.02) (2.87) 
townsize_2      -0.028 
      (-0.56) 
townsize_3      0.133+ 
      (1.95) 
townsize_4      0.028 
      (0.49) 
townsize_5      -0.006 
      (-0.11) 
townsize_6      0.103* 
      (2.07) 
townsize_7      0.053 
      (1.09) 
townsize_8      0.064 
      (1.13) 
_cons 8.133*** 8.230*** 8.245*** 8.242*** 8.098*** 8.031*** 
 (71.76) (65.78) (61.73) (58.20) (56.90) (57.70) 
Country Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 119765 103660 103444 100544 86305 71948 
Notes: 1) OLS regression with competition as dependent variable.  2) t-statistics in parentheses.  
3) Standard errors are robust to within country clustering.  4) + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.   
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Table A3. Logit estimations with macro controls on the full sample 
 full sample full sample full sample full sample full sample 
competition_bin1      
wave_3 -0.329* -0.312* -0.301* -0.325+ -0.319* 
 (-2.19) (-2.13) (-2.04) (-1.69) (-2.05) 
wave_4 -0.187+ -0.153 -0.136 -0.107 -0.176 
 (-1.70) (-1.41) (-1.20) (-1.01) (-1.45) 
transition 0.548*** 0.502*** 0.554*** 0.704*** 0.537*** 
 (7.61) (6.60) (6.88) (7.80) (6.69) 
wave3_trans -0.198 -0.168 -0.271 -0.716** -0.217 
 (-0.85) (-0.79) (-1.07) (-2.64) (-0.82) 
wave4_trans -0.442* -0.269 -0.422+ -0.990** -0.377+ 
 (-2.05) (-1.17) (-1.81) (-3.02) (-1.68) 
inflation -0.001*     
 (-2.29)     
gdp_growth_wdi  -0.023    
  (-1.52)    
ln_pcgdp_wdi   -0.213   
   (-0.68)   
unemp_oecd    0.032  
    (1.11)  
gini_gross_swiid     -0.003 
     (-0.17) 
Personal 
characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Income quintiles Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Marriage status  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Job-status  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Job dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Townsize  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 70319 70319 71948 49348 71207 
pseudo R2 0.048 0.048 0.048 0.057 0.049 
Notes: 1) Logit regression with competition_bin1 as dependent variable. 2) t-statistics in parentheses.  




Table A4. Unrestricted model – OECD and full sample, reporting all coefficients 
 OECD OECD full sample full sample 
competition_bin1     
wave_3 -0.228 -0.161 -0.228 -0.161 
 (-1.35) (-1.01) (-1.35) (-1.01) 
wave_4 -0.214+ -0.151 -0.214+ -0.151 
 (-1.91) (-1.45) (-1.91) (-1.45) 
transition 0.614** 0.475* 0.757*** 0.585*** 
 (3.14) (2.57) (5.25) (3.34) 
wave3_trans -0.695** -0.781* -0.473* -0.456+ 
 (-2.98) (-2.49) (-2.12) (-1.85) 
wave4_trans -0.525* -0.603** -0.410* -0.408* 
 (-2.47) (-2.69) (-2.38) (-2.16) 
age 0.000 -0.004 0.000 -0.004 
 (0.12) (-0.77) (0.12) (-0.78) 
trans_age 0.016* 0.017+ 0.008 0.009 
 (2.06) (1.67) (1.20) (0.93) 
age_sqr 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 
 (2.12) (2.36) (2.12) (2.37) 
trans_agesqr -0.000*** -0.000** -0.000*** -0.000* 
 (-4.16) (-2.87) (-3.68) (-2.49) 
female -0.258*** -0.227*** -0.258*** -0.227*** 
 (-7.53) (-6.42) (-7.56) (-6.44) 
trans_female 0.072 0.066 0.049 0.005 
 (1.50) (1.23) (1.07) (0.11) 
inc_quint1 -0.074 -0.099 -0.074 -0.099 
 (-0.78) (-1.26) (-0.78) (-1.27) 
trans_inc1 0.017 0.060 0.072 0.129 
 (0.16) (0.59) (0.66) (1.25) 
inc_quint2 -0.041 -0.061 -0.041 -0.061 
 (-0.64) (-1.19) (-0.64) (-1.19) 
trans_inc2 -0.072 -0.065 0.002 0.015 
 (-0.95) (-0.94) (0.02) (0.22) 
inc_quint4 0.059 0.036 0.059 0.036 
 (1.22) (0.84) (1.23) (0.85) 
trans_inc4 -0.053 -0.031 0.020 0.026 
 (-0.77) (-0.44) (0.27) (0.35) 
inc_quint5 0.186** 0.146** 0.186** 0.146** 
 (3.22) (2.89) (3.23) (2.90) 
trans_inc5 -0.061 -0.066 0.107 0.093 
 (-0.60) (-0.53) (1.27) (1.18) 
stat_married  0.002  0.002 
  (0.04)  (0.04) 
trans_stat_married  0.035  0.037 
  (0.72)  (0.66) 
stat_divorced  0.030  0.030 
  (0.51)  (0.51) 
trans_stat_divorced  0.019  0.025 
  (0.27)  (0.32) 
stat_widowed  -0.001  -0.001 
  (-0.01)  (-0.01) 
trans_stat_widowed  0.022  -0.002 
  (0.22)  (-0.03) 
jobstat_part  -0.121**  -0.121** 
  (-2.61)  (-2.62) 
trans_jobstat_part  0.011  0.042 
  (0.12)  (0.67) 
jobstat_self  0.139*  0.139* 
  (2.00)  (2.00) 
trans_jobstat_self  -0.006  -0.032 
  (-0.07)  (-0.32) 
jobstat_retired  0.079  0.079 
  (1.62)  (1.62) 
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trans_jobstat_retired  0.035  -0.024 
  (0.51)  (-0.34) 
jobstat_wife  0.062  0.062 
  (1.32)  (1.32) 
trans_jobstat_wife  0.146  0.166+ 
  (1.47)  (1.92) 
jobstat_student  -0.118  -0.118 
  (-0.80)  (-0.80) 
trans_jobstat_student  -0.167  0.183 
  (-0.47)  (0.85) 
jobstat_unemp  -0.101  -0.101 
  (-1.38)  (-1.39) 
trans_jobstat_unemp  0.327**  0.220* 
  (3.20)  (2.06) 
jobstat_other  0.036  0.036 
  (0.25)  (0.26) 
trans_jobstat_other  -0.126  -0.065 
  (-0.59)  (-0.33) 
job_manager  0.326***  0.326*** 
  (6.62)  (6.64) 
trans_job_manager  0.154  0.088 
  (1.34)  (0.82) 
job_office  -0.018  -0.018 
  (-0.39)  (-0.39) 
trans_job_office  0.131  0.185* 
  (1.49)  (2.51) 
job_farmer  0.017  0.017 
  (0.27)  (0.27) 
trans_job_farmer  -0.357***  -0.300** 
  (-3.70)  (-3.22) 
job_military  0.237+  0.237+ 
  (1.84)  (1.85) 
trans_job_military  0.161  0.154 
  (0.88)  (0.92) 
job_never  -0.063  -0.063 
  (-0.89)  (-0.89) 
trans_job_never  0.016  -0.017 
  (0.12)  (-0.17) 
_cons -1.140*** -1.052*** -1.140*** -1.052*** 
 (-15.16) (-10.59) (-15.21) (-10.62) 
Country Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 83439 69849 103660 86305 
pseudo R2 0.051 0.056 0.050 0.053 
Notes: 1) Logit regression with competition_bin1 as dependent variable. 2) t-statistics in parentheses.  
3) Standard errors are robust to within country clustering. 4) + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.   
 
Table A5: Robustness check: different cut-offs, OECD and full sample 
 OECD OECD OECD full sample full sample full sample 
 comp_bin2 comp_bin3 comp_bin4 comp_bin2 comp_bin3 comp_bin4 
       
wave_3 -0.205 -0.204+ -0.180* -0.204 -0.202+ -0.180* 
 (-1.60) (-1.84) (-2.09) (-1.59) (-1.83) (-2.09) 
wave_4 -0.158* -0.232*** -0.209*** -0.153* -0.229*** -0.207*** 
 (-2.30) (-3.82) (-3.54) (-2.25) (-3.78) (-3.51) 
transition 0.573*** 0.445*** 0.272** 0.519*** 0.435*** 0.298*** 
 (7.04) (4.90) (3.06) (7.59) (6.75) (5.26) 
wave3_trans -0.611** -0.363+ -0.185 -0.450* -0.341* -0.252* 
 (-2.90) (-1.68) (-0.83) (-2.52) (-2.27) (-1.98) 
wave4_trans -0.482** -0.349+ -0.340* -0.419** -0.316* -0.338** 
 (-2.75) (-1.92) (-2.08) (-3.17) (-2.47) (-3.01) 
age -0.004 -0.003 -0.008 -0.008 -0.006 -0.009+ 
 (-0.81) (-0.64) (-1.35) (-1.58) (-1.25) (-1.75) 
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age_sqr 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000+ 0.000 0.000+ 
 (1.32) (1.00) (1.57) (1.65) (1.30) (1.70) 
female -0.275*** -0.286*** -0.265*** -0.281*** -0.287*** -0.270*** 
 (-10.57) (-11.11) (-10.32) (-12.11) (-12.34) (-11.99) 
inc_quint1 -0.153** -0.180*** -0.252*** -0.122** -0.166*** -0.235*** 
 (-3.25) (-4.43) (-7.32) (-2.92) (-4.75) (-7.90) 
inc_quint2 -0.099** -0.117*** -0.133*** -0.080** -0.099*** -0.120*** 
 (-3.09) (-4.69) (-5.55) (-2.88) (-4.65) (-5.79) 
inc_quint4 0.074** 0.122*** 0.119*** 0.089*** 0.132*** 0.133*** 
 (3.02) (5.12) (5.21) (3.62) (6.02) (6.21) 
inc_quint5 0.267*** 0.366*** 0.407*** 0.307*** 0.384*** 0.422*** 
 (9.39) (10.92) (11.67) (10.83) (14.15) (14.02) 
stat_married 0.065+ 0.059 0.041 0.062* 0.049 0.039 
 (1.82) (1.33) (0.88) (2.10) (1.30) (0.97) 
stat_divorced 0.040 0.024 -0.043 0.053 0.046 -0.015 
 (0.82) (0.46) (-0.86) (1.29) (1.05) (-0.34) 
stat_widowed 0.049 0.039 -0.005 0.024 0.012 -0.027 
 (1.05) (0.77) (-0.10) (0.57) (0.26) (-0.57) 
jobstat_part -0.153*** -0.143*** -0.136** -0.137*** -0.124*** -0.104* 
 (-3.37) (-3.53) (-2.92) (-3.41) (-3.62) (-2.45) 
jobstat_self 0.182*** 0.116** 0.071 0.172*** 0.120** 0.077+ 
 (3.46) (2.69) (1.60) (3.43) (3.03) (1.89) 
jobstat_retired 0.005 -0.009 -0.028 -0.029 -0.040 -0.052 
 (0.13) (-0.21) (-0.65) (-0.84) (-1.08) (-1.36) 
jobstat_wife 0.013 0.012 -0.018 0.026 0.029 0.000 
 (0.34) (0.32) (-0.34) (0.71) (0.81) (0.01) 
jobstat_student -0.024 0.019 0.068 -0.008 0.044 0.110* 
 (-0.41) (0.45) (1.32) (-0.17) (1.18) (2.27) 
jobstat_unemp -0.165*** -0.198*** -0.248*** -0.151** -0.176*** -0.229*** 
 (-3.83) (-5.78) (-5.51) (-3.22) (-4.78) (-5.67) 
jobstat_other 0.048 -0.074 -0.035 0.002 -0.085 -0.070 
 (0.76) (-1.14) (-0.57) (0.03) (-1.58) (-1.22) 
_cons -0.102 0.801*** 1.493*** 0.018 0.899*** 1.547*** 
 (-0.93) (6.87) (11.49) (0.16) (8.00) (13.23) 
Country Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 80528 80528 80528 100544 100544 100544 
pseudo R2 0.050 0.047 0.046 0.048 0.045 0.044 
Notes: 1) Logit regression with competition_bin2, _bin3 _bin4 as dependent variable.  
2) t-statistics in parentheses. 3) Standard errors are robust to within country clustering.  
4) + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.   
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Table A6: Descriptive Statistic of need_change_bin1 by country (only surveyed in wave 2) 
 need_change need_change_bin1 Freq. 
country 1989-1993 1989-1993  
    
Belgium 3.425 0.143 2,405 
Bulgaria 4.655 0.732 952 
Canada 4.216 0.392 1,682 
Chile 4.300 0.545 1,465 
Czech 
Republic 4.492 0.603 2,968 
Denmark 4.347 0.528 992 
Estonia 4.689 0.740 971 
Finland 3.695 0.204 558 
France 3.615 0.207 932 
Germany 3.497 0.383 3,299 
Hungary 4.591 0.687 935 
Iceland 3.946 0.272 690 
Ireland 4.175 0.383 988 
Italy 4.111 0.360 1,897 
Japan 3.247 0.078 797 
Korea, Rep. 3.990 0.340 1,235 
Latvia 4.811 0.831 864 
Lithuania 4.412 0.522 944 
Mexico 4.319 0.537 1,458 
Netherlands 2.918 0.064 939 
Norway 3.812 0.281 1,229 
Poland 4.406 0.628 1,822 
Portugal 4.009 0.346 1,043 
Romania 4.340 0.500 1,051 
Russia 4.725 0.769 1,901 
Slovakia 4.363 0.510 1,513 
Slovenia 4.391 0.513 896 
Spain 4.203 0.416 3,559 
Sweden 4.197 0.455 973 
United 
Kingdom 4.058 0.336 1,413 
United States 4.087 0.320 1,752 
    
Total 4.124 0.443 44,123 
 
 
Table A7: The Effect of competition belief (dummies) on support for economic reform  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
need_change       
comp_bin9 -0.427*** -0.395*** -0.320*** -0.272*** -0.280*** -0.262*** 
 (-10.77) (-10.88) (-6.15) (-4.86) (-4.62) (-3.74) 
comp_bin8 -0.604*** -0.574*** -0.460*** -0.424*** -0.422*** -0.409*** 
 (-17.49) (-11.16) (-6.61) (-5.67) (-5.26) (-4.53) 
comp_bin7 -0.601*** -0.544*** -0.378*** -0.320** -0.310** -0.293* 
 (-11.84) (-7.32) (-3.92) (-3.28) (-2.98) (-2.56) 
comp_bin6 -0.435*** -0.395*** -0.182 -0.145 -0.138 -0.122 
 (-6.24) (-4.13) (-1.38) (-1.04) (-0.95) (-0.74) 
comp_bin5 -0.467*** -0.418*** -0.183 -0.183 -0.181 -0.182 
 (-5.48) (-3.58) (-1.16) (-1.10) (-1.04) (-0.89) 
comp_bin4 -0.385*** -0.325** -0.055 -0.007 -0.004 0.008 
 (-4.01) (-2.59) (-0.37) (-0.05) (-0.03) (0.05) 
comp_bin3 -0.266* -0.215 0.010 0.035 0.039 0.033 
 (-2.32) (-1.48) (0.06) (0.19) (0.20) (0.16) 
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comp_bin2 -0.130 -0.086 0.134 0.202 0.212 0.245 
 (-1.23) (-0.66) (0.91) (1.37) (1.39) (1.38) 
comp_bin1 0.381*** 0.415*** 0.660*** 0.593*** 0.615*** 0.659*** 
 (3.73) (3.54) (5.61) (5.04) (5.17) (4.79) 
transition  5.120*** 5.442*** 5.459*** 5.468*** 5.439*** 
  (47.32) (52.87) (50.69) (47.42) (45.27) 
comp_trans9   -0.143* -0.175* -0.172* -0.177+ 
   (-2.09) (-2.48) (-2.24) (-1.89) 
comp_trans8   -0.255*** -0.306*** -0.309*** -0.287** 
   (-3.58) (-3.79) (-3.58) (-2.99) 
comp_trans7   -0.460*** -0.520*** -0.539*** -0.506*** 
   (-3.84) (-4.21) (-4.16) (-3.54) 
comp_trans6   -0.643*** -0.678*** -0.695*** -0.693*** 
   (-3.92) (-3.95) (-3.90) (-3.33) 
comp_trans5   -0.818*** -0.802*** -0.810*** -0.721** 
   (-3.75) (-3.49) (-3.40) (-2.59) 
comp_trans4   -1.013*** -1.043*** -1.071*** -0.938*** 
   (-4.99) (-4.89) (-4.88) (-3.94) 
comp_trans3   -0.775*** -0.774*** -0.784** -0.581* 
   (-3.43) (-3.31) (-3.24) (-2.14) 
comp_trans2   -0.810*** -0.820*** -0.796*** -0.676** 
   (-3.69) (-3.94) (-3.71) (-3.19) 
comp_trans1   -0.833*** -0.768*** -0.800*** -0.851*** 
   (-4.55) (-4.16) (-4.36) (-4.02) 
cut1       
_cons -3.893*** -4.214*** -4.095*** -4.007*** -4.029*** -4.059*** 
 (-8.79) (-17.73) (-16.30) (-15.01) (-14.47) (-12.79) 
cut2       
_cons -2.333*** -2.526*** -2.404*** -2.318*** -2.333*** -2.363*** 
 (-9.01) (-18.62) (-16.43) (-13.20) (-13.10) (-11.36) 
cut3       
_cons -1.325*** -1.424*** -1.301*** -1.244*** -1.284*** -1.348*** 
 (-9.90) (-15.61) (-14.42) (-10.70) (-10.78) (-8.55) 
cut4       
_cons 0.557*** 0.600*** 0.726*** 0.782*** 0.766*** 0.739*** 
 (6.71) (7.00) (8.19) (6.68) (5.99) (4.37) 
Personal 
characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Income quintiles No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Marriage status  No No No No Yes Yes 
Job-status  No No No No Yes Yes 
Job dummies No No No No No Yes 
Townsize  No No No No No Yes 
Country Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 42475 42475 42475 37148 35737 28461 
pseudo R2 0.085 0.124 0.126 0.131 0.136 0.137 
Notes: 1) Ordered logit regression with need_change as dependent variable. 2) t-statistics in parentheses.  
3) Standard errors are robust to within country clustering. 4) + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.  












Item B1: Model specifications of extended models  
(1)   icticttctttcict XWTWTB   ')*(*  
(2)           )0Pr()1Pr( *  ictict BB  
The augmented model with macro-variables: 
(3)   ictictcttctttcict XMWTWTB   '')*(*  
(4)           )0Pr()1Pr( *  ictict BB  
The augmented model with country fixed effects: 
(5)   ictictctctttcict XWTWTB   ')*(*  
(6)           )0Pr()1Pr( *  ictict BB  
 
Item B2: Original wording of item on fairness of the market place 
Question: 
Now I'd like you to tell me your views on various issues. How would you place your views on 
this scale? 1 means you agree completely with the statement on the left; 10 means you agree 
completely with the statement on the right; and if your views fall somewhere in between, you 
can chose any number in between. Agreement: Hard work brings success. 
Responses: 
1 'In the long run, hard work usually brings a better life' 
… 
10 'Hard work doesn’t generally bring success - it’s more a matter of luck and connections' 
 
Item B3: Original wording of item for attitude toward reform: need_change_bin1 
Question: 
I am going to read out some statements about the government and the economy. For each one, 
could you tell me how much you agree or disagree? 
This country's economic system needs fundamental changes 
Responses: 
5 'Agree completely' 
4 'Agree somewhat' 
3 'Neither agree nor disagree' 
2 'Disagree somewhat' 





















Figure C1a: average levels of competition beliefs over time in transition countries 
 
 






















Figure C2a: average levels of competition beliefs over time in OECD countries 
 
 
Figure C2b: average levels of competition beliefs in OECD countries 
 
 
Figure C2c: average levels of competition beliefs in OECD countries 
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